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The growing awareness of the vulnerability of information transmitted on communication systems within the 
government, military and commercial sectors, has stimulated a number of areas of research within the optical 
community to design optical hardware encryption systems providing inherent immunity to espionage techniques. This 
paper describes a hardware optical encryption technique that utilises off the shelf telecommunication equipment and 
negates the necessity for an independent key distribution system with respect to the data transmission system, as is 
common with alternative encryption system implementations. This method also lends itself easily to fiber optic or free 
space communication and is applicable within any optical waveband. The encryption-decryption of the optical signal is 
achieved through low coherence optical interferometry. This requires the instantaneous processing and analysis of the 
signal, optically, to retrieve the relevant optical phase information hidden in the transmitted optical noise. This 
technology allows an authorised user to transmit encrypted information at a high data rate securely, while maintaining 
opaqueness to an unauthorised observer that data transmission is occurring. As the instantaneous optical field properties 
of the signals present in the system are essential to the optical encryption - decryption process, the system is inherently 
protected against electronic recording and advances in computational decryption algorithms. For organisations wishing 
to protect sensitive data and levels of communication activity these are highly desirable features. 
 






Current network security, both intra- and inter-network, relies on software encryption to prevent transmitted data from 
being read by an unauthorised observer. Where additional security is required, for instance by Government Agencies 
and Financial institutions, dedicated communication links are deployed. Although this strategy consists of a closed 
encryption unit (the encryption and decryption units are assumed to be held in a secure establishment; the transmission 
system is in the public domain.) and a closed decryption unit, the transmission system between the units is still open, 
and therefore still relies primarily on software encryption of the data being transferred to counter any espionage 
activities. The assumption behind software encryption algorithms is that they cannot be compromised, based on current 
known mathematical principles and algorithms, in an acceptable time frame before the encoded data becomes obsolete. 
To counter any perceived advances in mathematical decryption algorithms and technology advances, ever-longer 
software encryption codes are employed. Unfortunately, if an algorithm becomes compromised the organisation 
employing the relevant coding algorithm is invariably the last to discover. A second, more subtle, disadvantage of 
employing software encryption on current optical intensity modulated telecommunication networks is that of activity 
level. If a Vernam (Gilbert Vernam 1917) one-time pad code is being applied to data, in theory, an unwanted observer 
cannot decipher the data without the unique decryption key. However, the unwanted observer can monitor network 
traffic volumes and their destination and be alerted to potential activities. 
 
Due to concern over the security of software encryption, research into encrypting the data within the optical properties 
of the carrier wave itself is being investigated worldwide [1,2,3,4]. A prevalent optical phenomenon that provides an 
inherent means of burying data within a noisy background, while transmitting information from the source, is that of 
White Light Interferometry. This phenomenon is ubiquitous in nature and finds a partial application in the fields of 
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remote Fiber Optic Sensors [5] and Surface Tomography [6,7]. In the Optical Field Encryption technique proposed 
here, the information to be communicated is embedded in the random phase fluctuations of the spectral content 
comprising a broadband optical source’s output. By applying the principles of white light interferometry, this composite 
optical signal is then optically encrypted. To subsequently decrypt the original information from the optical source’s 
spectral content, a hardware decryption configuration having unique physical parameters defined by it’s corresponding 
encryption unit must be realised. By employing the methods used in Optical Fourier Transform spectroscopy the 
Optical Field Encryption technique can be realised either in optical fiber or free space forms. 
 
2. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION 
 
In the optical field encryption technique proposed here, a tandem interferometer arrangement performs the signal 
encryption and decryption operations, optically. One interferometer performs the role of the encryption unit and the 
other that of the decryption unit. The optical encryption unit phase modulates the data to be transmitted onto the spectral 
content of an optical broadband source and then encrypts the resulting signal. This can be accomplished by splitting the 
output of  the optical broadband source into two signals, E1(t) and E2(t),  through amplitude division. One of the signals, 
E2(t) for instance, forms an optical reference signal containing the optical sources’ spectral phase, polarisation and 
amplitude content at time t. This signal is transmitted directly to the decryption unit over the communication link. The 
second optical signal, E1(t), whose complex optical field spectrum is a replica of E2(t), is phase modulated by the data to 
be transmitted,  
 
E1 (t) → E1 (t+θ(t)).  
 
A predetermined temporal optical delay, τ1, or equivalent optical phase shift, on the longitudinal path of E1 is then 
applied,  
 
E1(t+θ(t)) → E1(t+θ(t)+ τ1). 
 
This composite signal is transmitted over the same communication link to the decryption unit. The decryption unit 
recovers the phase modulation component, θ(t), by optically processing the autocorrelation function, c(τ), of the optical 
signal, E1(t+θ(t)+ τ1). This process generates an observable interferogram that can be recorded electronically. This is 
accomplished by applying the same longitudinal path temporal optical delay, τ2 = τ1, or equivalent optical phase shift, 
onto the received optical reference signal, E2(t), as performed by the encryption unit on E1. 
     
E2(t) → E2(t+ τ2). 
 
The autocorrelation function is then obtained by simply interfering the optical signal E1(t+θ(t)+ τ1) with E2(t+ τ2)  
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This process generates the autocorrelation function or optical interferogram of the signal spectrum at the receiving 
photodetector. By maintaining τ2 = τ1,  the data phase modulation, θ(t),  present on the encrypted optical signal, E1, 
causes an intensity modulation to appear during this interferometric recombination process. It is this resulting intensity 
modulation that is recorded to recover the original data that applied the phase modulation at the encryption unit.  
 
The presence at the encryption and decryption units of identical longitudinal path delays, τ2 = τ1, or equivalent phase 
shifts, determines whether coherent optical interference between the two signals will occur and the existence of a 
detectable autocorrelation function. Therefore the longitudinal path delay τ1, or equivalent optical phase shift, at the 
encryption unit, defines the optical encryption key. In the absence of the correct optical decryption key, τ2 ≠ τ1 within 
the decryption unit, the encrypted optical signal containing the data phase information is indistinguishable, for example, 
from a broadband signal source, or an amplified optical noise source. The signals, E1 and E2, are transmitted over the 
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same communication link, but with a relative delay. Provided this delay is not greater than the periodicity of any 
turbulence or distortions on the communication link, both signals experience an identical transmission path. 
 
The bulk optic tandem interferometer arrangement in Figure 1 demonstrates a simple practical realisation of the Optical 
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Figure 1 Encryption-Decryption System realised using bulk optics in free space. 
 




Figure 2 Encryption-Decryption System realised using fiber optic components. 
 
The  parameters required to design the above optical field encryption system can be taken directly from the theoretical 
derivations of other disciplines employing white light interferometry [8,9]. To observe an interferogram the difference 
between delay paths τ1 and τ2 must be less than the coherence length of the source. The coherence length of an optical 
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source with a Gaussian spectral profile can, to a first approximation, be calculated from (1) and is tabulated in table 1 







l .  (1) 
 
Transmission Window Coherence Length (microns) 
780nm ~ 15 
1310nm ~ 43 
1550nm ~ 60 
 






The set-up in figure 1 was realised using standard telecommunications components at 1550nm. The transmission 
medium was initially a free space length of 1 metre on an optical bench , but was subsequently replaced by 30m of 
optical fiber, conforming to ITU G652 , a 15dB attenuator and an Erbium Doped Fiber Amplifier providing 25dB gain. 
  
The Encryption and Decryption units employ the same elements except the SLED is replaced by a photodiode at the 
decryption unit and the encryption unit has one mirror mounted on a low voltage piezoelectric transducer element. This 
mirror mounting arrangement allows the electronic data source to phase modulate the optical signal, θ(t)).  
 
Amplitude division of the signal was implemented with anti-reflection coated cube beamsplitters of R:T ≈ 45:45 % at 
1550nm. Front Surface Mirrors specified to a flatness of lambda/4 at 635nm were employed. The motor driven 
translation stage, M1, was arbitrarily positioned longitudinally but collinear with the path of the source’s output beam. 
The translation stage in the decryption unit, M4, was actively locked through intensity detection of the interferogram 
envelope peak by the photodetector, PD, to provide the same path length over paths 1 and 3 as over paths 2 and 4 to an 
accuracy of 50nm. The piezoelectric transducer that mirror M2 was mounted on, provided a displacement of 3µm for a 
drive voltage of 100V. The requirement here was for a maximum displacement of 0.75µm, the width of one fringe in 
the interferogram of figure 4. Detection and storage of the decrypted transmitted data was attained using a prepackaged 
PIN photodiode, PD, interfaced to a computer through a Data Acquisition Card. 
 
This set-up can easily be enhanced to provide higher modulation rates by replacing the piezoelectric driven mirror with 
an in-line bulk phase modulator and the pre-packaged photodiode with a high speed photodetector. To protect against 
scanning of the encryption key by an external laser, an isolator, and if necessary an optical filter, can be placed at the 




The optical source employed was a Super Luminous Light Emitting Diode with a nominal centre wavelength at 1558nm 
and a FWHM bandwidth of 40nm. The measured spectrum is shown in figure 3 compared to a theoretical Gaussian 
profile. 
 




























Figure 3 Measured SLED spectrum compared to Gaussian profile. 
 
Scanning the path τ2 at the decryption unit with respect τ1 yields the longitudinal coherence function of the SLED 



























Figure 4 Source spectra and coherence function showing close to 82% visibility. 
 
This shows the high visibility (82%) and definition of the interferogram measured using a translation stage with a 
minimum step size of 50nm for the zero path difference case (i.e. the autocorrelation function of signal E1 is generated 
simultaneously, but independently with the autocorrelation function of E2 employing a balanced Michelson 
Interferometer, Path3 = Path4, to intercept the two signals, the two resulting interferograms, originating from Path1 and 
Path2, intensity distributions summing together but all data phase information, θ(t), is lost).  
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Figure 5 shows a 1kHz electrical modulated data waveform prior to optical encryption. This signal is used to phase 
modulate the optical signal in one arm of the encryption unit by amplitude modulation of the drive voltage applied to 























Figure 5 Data Modulation Waveform applied to M2 in figure 1. 
 
Figure 6 shows the corresponding recorded modulated waveform at the optical receivers electrical output of the signal 
in figure 5 after undergoing optical encryption, transmission and optical decryption when the correct optical decryption 


























Figure 6 Demodulation waveform recovered after optical decryption. 
 
Figure 7 shows the recorded signal when the incorrect optical decryption key is employed in the receiver unit. 
 




























An Optical Field Encryption technique realised using standard telecommunication and bulk optical components has 
been demonstrated. This technique is compatible with fiber optic network component technology and is applicable 
within all optical spectral transmission windows while offering high data transmission rates. As the data is phase 
encoded within the encrypted random phase of the optical field of a broadband optical source, decryption must occur 
instantaneously with the unique hardware key employed at the encryption unit. Otherwise the autocorrelation function 
and all the necessary optical information to reconstruct it and recover the original data phase modulation information 
will be lost to an unauthorised observer. The system can be potentially employed for encrypted data transmission, 
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